Determinism and prepunishment: the radical nature of compatibilism

Analysis 67 (4):347-349 (2007)
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Abstract

I shall argue that compatibilism cannot resist in a principled way the temptation to prepunish people. Compatibilism thus emerges as a much more radical view than it is typically presented and perceived, and is seen to be at odds with fundamental moral intuitions.

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Saul Smilansky
University of Haifa

References found in this work

Time and Punishment.Christopher New - 1992 - Analysis 52 (1):35 - 40.
The Time to Punish.Saul Smilansky - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):50 - 53.
Punishing Times: Reply to Smilansky.Christopher New - 1995 - Analysis 55 (1):60 - 62.

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