Poverty and Epistemic Dehumanisation

In Leonie Smith & Alfred Archer, The Moral Psychology of Poverty (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This chapter draws on experiences of being identified as the financial precariat in the UK to argue that testimonial interactions between those who are in financially precarious conditions, and agents of the street-level organisations responsible for provision of health services, security and welfare, are at systematic risk of being dangerously epistemically dehumanising. This epistemic dehumanisation differs from instances of testimonial injustice in which the speaker retains some element of epistemic subjectivity and control over her contribution to the interaction. We are epistemically dehumanised when we are expected to act as epistemic agents in testimonial contexts which are of great importance to us, while being met by an audience which is heavily predisposed against hearing us speak. The conditions under which this is likely to take place are strongly predicted for people marked out as poor, in their interactions with street-level organisations and their agents. As a result, the speaker who is often in serious need of help, is left epistemically disenfranchised, and at severe and probable risk of material harm.

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Leonie Smith
Lancaster University

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