Propositions: Who Needs Them?

Philosophia Christi 24 (2):241-255 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

William Lane Craig maintains that propositions and properties are not real. Yet, if we examine his proposed nominalism and his appeal to Rudolf Carnap’s linguistic frameworks, we can find that his view depends upon their reality, even as abstract objects. By drawing upon phenomenological insights, I argue that if we pay close attention to what can be before our minds in conscious awareness, we can become aware that there is more to what is real than simple, concrete particulars, even in his linguistic examples. We can become aware of the reality of Platonic, ante rem universals, including propositions and properties.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,314

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Craig’s Nominalism and the High Cost of Preserving Divine Aseity.R. Scott Smith - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):87--107.
Awareness.Paul Silva - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup, The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
Spinoza on Universals.Halla Kim - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:149-155.
Gödel’s Disjunctive Argument†.Wesley Wrigley - 2022 - Philosophia Mathematica 30 (3):306-342.
Semantics for Knowledge and Change of Awareness.Hans van Ditmarsch & Tim French - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):169-195.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-02-23

Downloads
23 (#983,168)

6 months
2 (#1,294,541)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references