Abstract

A renegade positivist himself, Quine eschewed apriority, necessity, and analyticity, while (for a time) adopting a holistic version of verificationism. Despite similarities in their opposition to Quine, the differences between Lewis and Kripke were large ‐ especially in the semantics and metaphysics of modality. They also had different philosophical styles. Lewis's (1970b) was one of the cutting‐edge texts of its time ‐ along with work by Richard Montague, David Kaplan, and Robert Stalnaker. Together, they laid out a powerful framework for the use of intensional logic in semantic theories of natural language. Lewis was, of course, the author of many more influential articles in the philosophy of language. A final one that must be mentioned is Lewis (1975a). In it, he argues that sentence adverbs such as ′always′, ′usually′, ′often′, sometimes′, and ′never′ are unselective quantifiers that bind all free variables in their scope.