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Propositions as Cognitive Acts
Synthese 196 (4):1369-1383 (2019)
Abstract
The paper reviews the central components of the cognitive theory of propositions and explains both its empirical advantages for theories of language and mind and its foundational metaphysical and epistemological advantages over other theories. It then answers a leading objection to the theory, before closing by raising the issue of how questions, which are the contents of interrogative sentences, and directives, which are the contents of imperative sentences, are related to propositions.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2021 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.
First among equals: co-hyperintensionality for structured propositions.Bjørn Jespersen - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4483-4497.
Acts of desire.Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (9):955-972.
References found in this work
Beyond rigidity: the unfinished semantic agenda of Naming and necessity.Scott Soames - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
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