Propositions as Cognitive Acts

Synthese 196 (4):1369-1383 (2019)
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Abstract

The paper reviews the central components of the cognitive theory of propositions and explains both its empirical advantages for theories of language and mind and its foundational metaphysical and epistemological advantages over other theories. It then answers a leading objection to the theory, before closing by raising the issue of how questions, which are the contents of interrogative sentences, and directives, which are the contents of imperative sentences, are related to propositions.

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Scott Soames
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.

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