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Why the traditional conceptions of propositions can't be correct?
In Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames & Jeffrey Speaks (eds.), New Thinking About Propositions. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press (2014)
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Citations of this work
Predication and the Frege–Geach problem.Indrek Reiland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):141-159.
If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated?Marie Duží - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1249-1283.
Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.
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