Two Cornell realisms: moral and scientific

Philosophical Studies 172 (4):905-924 (2015)
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Abstract

Richard Boyd and Nicholas Sturgeon develop distinctive naturalistic arguments for scientific realism and moral realism. Each defends a realist position by an inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I suggest that these arguments for realism should be reformulated, with the law of likelihood replacing inference to the best explanation. The resulting arguments for realism do not work

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Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison