The Unconscious and the Pre-reflective Cogito

der 16. Weltkongress Für Philosophie 2:1210-1216 (1983)
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Abstract

In this essay I critically examine Jean-Paul Sartre's theory, that all consciousness not only must have an object but also must always be self-aware, that a self-conscious "pre-reflective cogito" accompanies all consciousness. I attempt to show how this doctrine is meant to support Sarte's general rejection of the possibility of unconscious mental processes and that Sartre's arguments for the presence of such a self-conscious "pre-reflective cogito" in all consciousnesses are unsound.

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Ivan Soll
University of Wisconsin, Madison

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