Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology [Book Review]

In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 253-270 (1996)
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Abstract

Comprehensive and packed, Alvin Plantinga's two-volume treatise defies sum- mary. The first volume, Warrant: Current Views, is a meticulous critical survey of epistemology today. Many current approaches are presented and exhaustively discussed, and a negative verdict is passed on each in turn. This prepares the way for volume two, Warrant and Proper Function, where a positive view is advanced and developed in satisfying detail. The cumulative result is most impressive, and should command attention for years to come. Here I cannot possibly do justice to the scope and richness of Plantinga's accomplishment. Given the limitations imposed by the occasion, I will discuss only what seem the most important and original proposals, and will compare them with some relevant alternatives

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original Sosa, Ernest; Plantinga, Alvin (1993) "Proper Functionalism and Virtue EpistemologyWarrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function". Noûs 27(1):51

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Ernest Sosa
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

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