Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles

Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):410 (1997)
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Abstract

According to Moore, his argument meets three conditions for being a proof: first, the premiss is different from the conclusion; second, he knows the premiss to be the case; and, third, the conclusion follows deductively.2 Further conditions may be required, but he evidently thinks his proof would satisfy these as well. As Moore is well aware, many philosophers will feel he has not given “...any satisfactory proof of the point in question."3 Some, he believes, will want the premiss itself proved. But he has..

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Ernest Sosa
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.
What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.
Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.

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