Zabarella and the Intentionality of Sensation

Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 1 (2002)
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Abstract

Zabarella and the Intentionality of Sensation - ABSTRACT: In this paper, I examine Zabarella’s account of the intentionality of sensation. By looking at both his account of the production of the sensible species as well as proper activity of the human soul in the process of sensation, I show that he has carefully reinterpreted standard medieval theories of sensation. Most notably, his account of intentionality as a kind of mental attention seems to point towards a type of Cartesian dualism, but at the same time attempts to remain faithful to the basic insights of the Aristotelian tradition concerning sensation.

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James South
Marquette University

Citations of this work

On Vít Gvoždiak's “John Searle's Theory of Sign”.Phila Msimang - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (2):255-261.
Giacomo Zabarella.Heikki Mikkeli - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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