Spinoza’s Critique of Humility in the Ethics

Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):342-364 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Abstract: In the "Ethics" Spinoza denies that humility is a virtue on the grounds that it arises from a reflection on our lack of power, rather than a rational understanding of our power (Part IV, Proposition 53, Demonstration). He suggests that humility, to the extent that it involves a consideration of our weakness, indicates a lack of self-understanding. However, in a brief remark in the same demonstration he also allows that conceiving our lack of power can be conducive to self-understanding and an increase in power, on the condition that we “conceive [it] because [we] understand (intelligit) something more powerful than [ourselves].” Unfortunately, Spinoza does not flesh out this remark, nor does he specify the name of the affect that arises from thus conceiving our weakness. Commentators have not been of much help in this regard either. What does it mean, in the Spinozistic framework, to conceive our weakness because we understand something more powerful than ourselves? And what exactly is the difference between this instance of conceiving our lack of power and the one that is involved in humility? This paper will examine the nature of this difference by analyzing its metaphysical and epistemological underpinnings, as well as its ethical implications within Spinoza’s Ethics. In doing so, it will highlight the ethical importance and epistemological conditions of recognizing our weakness in the Spinozistic universe. Abraham Wolf takes Spinoza’s denial of humility’s virtue in the Ethics to imply that “the rational man should think of what he can do, not of what he cannot do.” While I agree with Wolf’s remark, my reading in this paper will show that as the rational person thinks of her power and what she can do, she never loses sight of her ineliminable weakness as a finite mode.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,343

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Humility.John McMillan - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (4):227-228.
Two Ethical Ideals in Spinoza’s "Ethics": The Free Man and The Wise Man.Sanem Soyarslan - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):357-370.
“When having too much Power is Harmful? - Spinoza on Political Luck”.Yitzhak Melamed - 2017 - In Yitzhak Y. Melamed & Hasana Sharp, Spinoza's Political Treatise: A Critical Guide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 161-174.
Spinozistic Self-Preservation.Andrew Youpa - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):477-490.
“Nemo non videt”: Intuitive Knowledge and the Question of Spinoza's Elitism.Hasana Sharp - 2011 - In Smith Justin & Fraenkel Carlos, The Rationalists. Springer/Synthese. pp. 101--122.
Reconsidering Spinoza's Free Man: The Model of Human Nature.Matthew Kisner - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 5.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-24

Downloads
84 (#257,751)

6 months
7 (#469,699)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sanem Soyarslan
North Carolina State University

References found in this work

Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation.Edwin M. Curley - 1969 - Cambridge,: Harvard University Press.
Acosmism or weak individuals?: Hegel, Spinoza, and the reality of the finite.Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (1):pp. 77-92.
Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation.Edwin M. Curley - 1969 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 32 (2):335-338.
Spinoza.Don Garrett & R. J. Delahunty - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (4):610.

View all 25 references / Add more references