Plato’s Epistemology: Being and Seeming

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):511-514 (2023)
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Abstract

A two-worlds view of Plato’s epistemology holds that the objects of the epistemic powers knowledge and belief cannot overlap. Whereas, an overlap view claims that they can. The two-worlds view has...

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10.1080/00048402.2023.2169947

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Rupert Sparling
Stanford University

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