Sexism and human enhancement

Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (12):732-735 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I respond to recent criticisms, by Paula Casal, of my arguments about the implications of John Harris and Julian Savulescu's influential arguments for human enhancement for sex selection. I argue that, despite her protestations, her paper relies upon the idea that parents have a moral obligation to have children that will serve the interests of the nation. Casal’s use of dubious claims about inherent psychological differences between men and women to make her hypothetical case for moral enhancement and her troubling references to “evolved humans” only exacerbate the political dangers involved in the argument for human enhancement.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,174

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-22

Downloads
57 (#378,204)

6 months
14 (#233,812)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Sparrow
Monash University

Citations of this work

Reform, not destroy: reply to McMahan, Sparrow and Temkin.Paula Casal - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (12):741-742.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
On the distinction between disease and illness.Christopher Boorse - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1):49-68.

View all 24 references / Add more references