Abstract

The existence of non-standard models of first-order Peano-Arithmetic (PA) threatens to undermine the claim of the moderate mathematical realist that non-mysterious access to the natural number structure is possible on the basis of our best arithmetical theories. The move to logics stronger than FOL is denied to the moderate realist on the grounds that it merely shifts the indeterminacy “one level up” into the meta-theory by, illegitimately, assuming the determinacy of the notions needed to formulate such logics. This paper argues that the challenge can be met. We show how the quantifier “there are infinitely many” can be uniquely determined in a naturalistically acceptable fashion and thus be used in the formulation of a theory of arithmetic. We compare the approach pursued here with Field’s justification of the same device and the popular strategy of invoking a second-order formalism, and argue that it is more robust than either of the alternative proposals.