Abstract

The main objective of this dissertation is to give a theoretical reconstruction of concept formation in science and theology. This theoretical reconstruction is limited to an account of concept formation based upon models. Models and their constituent concepts are mental representations. The model or mental representation of one domain is used to conceptualize the domain under investigation . When new concepts are formed in the topic domain on the basis of models of another domain , these concepts are formed out of concepts used in the model domain. The new concepts are formed by deleting, and sometimes adding, content from the concepts of the model domain. Since concepts have other concepts as their content, the adding and deleting of content is the adding and deleting of concepts which make up the content of some concept. ;The next objective of this dissertation is to show that scientific theories and theologies determine what content is deleted and added. Scientific theories and theologies must describe a domain and explain its phenomena. It is these requirements that determine what the content of the new concept will be, and thus, we can say that it is scientific theories and theologies that determine what content the new concepts will have. ;The terms that express these new concepts are called T-terms. A theory of the linguistic meaning of these T-terms is presented. Since part of the meaning of any T-term is the content of the concept that the term expresses, it follows that scientific theories and theologies also determine part of the meaning of T-terms. ;Finally, I apply the theory of concept formation to divine mental and action concepts. The contents of these concepts are derived from the contents of human mental and action concepts. While the contents of the divine concepts are different in many respects, these concepts are shown to be intelligible. At the same time their content does not compromise God's "otherness" from his creatures