Counterfactuals and Humean Reduction

In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 411–424 (2015)
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Abstract

This chapter starts with Goodman's project, saying what his aim was, spelling out the resources that he allowed himself to use in order to accomplish this aim, and explaining why the aim could not be accomplished with these resources. The author considers Goodman's response to the acknowledged failure of his initial attempt at analysis: how he proposed to redefine his Humean project. The chapter sketches David Lewis's project, which has two parts: an abstract formal semantic analysis of conditionals, and an attempt to explain the primitive parameters of the semantic models in a way that is austere enough to satisfy the Humean structures. The author argues that Lewis does not succeed in identifying a suitable base for a reduction of counterfactuals and other causal notions. The chapter concludes with a brief remark on the problems that remain if we reject the project of Humean reduction.

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Robert Stalnaker
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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