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Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory
In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 55--88 (2009)
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Is it time for a tri-process theory? Distinguishing the reflective and algorithmic mind.K. E. Stanovich - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 55--88.
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Citations of this work
Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning.Keith Frankish - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.
On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology.Guy Kahane - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (5):519-545.
The role of answer fluency and perceptual fluency as metacognitive cues for initiating analytic thinking.Valerie A. Thompson, Jamie A. Prowse Turner, Gordon Pennycook, Linden J. Ball, Hannah Brack, Yael Ophir & Rakefet Ackerman - 2013 - Cognition 128 (2):237-251.
What we can (and can’t) infer about implicit bias from debiasing experiments.Nick Byrd - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-29.
Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
References found in this work
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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