Introduction

In Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
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Abstract

This chapter lays out the basic evidence for the thesis that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is partly determined by his or her practical interests. It considers and rejects a range of responses to the evidence that would undermine the case for Interest-Relative Invariantism.

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Jason Stanley
Yale University

Citations of this work

The Conversational Role of Centered Contents.Max Kölbel - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):97-121.
Agreement and Communication.Max Kölbel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):101-120.

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