Knowledge Ascriptions and Gradability

In Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
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Abstract

Many expressions in natural language, such as adjectives like tall and flat, or verbs such as like and regret are gradable, meaning that they occur in comparative constructions. It makes sense to speak of something being taller than another thing, or regretting something more than something else. It is argued that ‘know’ is not a gradable expression. This raises serious worries for versions of contextualism that treat ‘know’ as denoting relations of varying strength, relative to different contexts of use.

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Jason Stanley
Yale University

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