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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality
Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2018)
Abstract
How should thinkers cope with uncertainty? Julia Staffel breaks new ground in the study of rationality by answering this question and many others. She also explains how it is better to be less irrational, because less irrational degrees of belief are generally more accurate and better at guiding our actions.Author's Profile
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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel.Claire Field - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):724-733.
Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. ix + 217. [REVIEW]Claire Field - 2021 - Mind 130.
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An accuracy characterisation of approximate coherence.Giacomo Molinari - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):1-25.
Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.
Bayesian Norms and Non-Ideal Agents.Julia Staffel - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
The Role of Context in Belief Evaluation: Costs and Benefits of Irrational Beliefs.Elly Vintiadis & Lisa Bortolotti - 2022 - In Julien Musolino, Joseph Sommer & Pernille Hemmer (eds.), The Cognitive Science of Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 92 - 110.
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Citations of this work
Are Credences Different From Beliefs?Roger Clarke & Julia Staffel - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.
Standards for Belief Representations in LLMs.Daniel A. Herrmann & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2024 - Minds and Machines 35 (1):1-25.
References found in this work
Representation theorems and the foundations of decision theory.Christopher Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.
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