What is it like to be a zombie?

In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 385--400 (2002)
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Abstract

This paper examines the disagreement between those who think zombies are possible and those who think they are not. It aims to shed light on general questions about the nature of modal claims, and about the relation between metaphysical, semantic, and empirical questions. The views of three functional philosophers who provide unequivocal answers to the question “Are zombies possible?” are described.

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2005

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10.1093/0199251487.003.0014

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Robert Stalnaker
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Philip Goff - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
Illusions of gunk.J. Robert G. Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513.
Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Van Inwagen’s modal skepticism.Peter Hawke - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):351-364.

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