A relative notion of natural generalization

Philosophy of Science 42 (1):46-48 (1975)
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Abstract

According to our intuitions, certain generalizations are better confirmed by positive instances than others. In order to characterize the difference between these generalizations, I have proposed in [3] to investigate the generalizing behavior of living beings. Such an investigation makes it possible to classify into different categories the generalizations that are intuitively confirmed by their positive instances and those that are not intuitively confirmed by such instances. One important aspect of my treatment, however, has been shown to be unsatisfactory: sentences that are logically equivalent may belong to different categories. In this paper, I shall first give a short summary of the relevant parts of my previous paper, and then I shall try to improve it in order to avoid the undesirable result.

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Citations of this work

A partial solution to the Goodman paradox.Nathan Stemmer - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (2):177 - 185.
Projectible predicates.Nathan Stemmer - 1979 - Synthese 41 (3):375 - 395.
A solution to the lottery paradox.Nathan Stemmer - 1982 - Synthese 51 (3):339 - 353.
The Objective Confirmation of Hypotheses.Nathan Stemmer - 1981 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):395 - 404.

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References found in this work

Three problems in induction.Nathan Stemmer - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2-3):287 - 308.

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