Foundations of Mathematics: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Structure

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):16 - 37 (2004)
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Abstract

Since virtually every mathematical theory can be interpreted in set theory, the latter is a foundation for mathematics. Whether set theory, as opposed to any of its rivals, is the right foundation for mathematics depends on what a foundation is for. One purpose is philosophical, to provide the metaphysical basis for mathematics. Another is epistemic, to provide the basis of all mathematical knowledge. Another is to serve mathematics, by lending insight into the various fields. Another is to provide an arena for exploring relations and interactions between mathematical fields, their relative strengths, etc. Given the different goals, there is little point to determining a single foundation for all of mathematics.

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Stewart Shapiro
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

What is neologicism?Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):60-99.
A Mereology for the Change of Parts.Pierdaniele Giaretta & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2011 - In Majda Trobok, Nenad Miščević & Berislav Žarnić (eds.), Between Logic and Reality: Modeling Inference, Action and Understanding. Dordrecht and New York: Springer. pp. 243--259.
Towards a Formal Account of Identity Criteria.Massimiliano Carrara & Silvia Gaio - 2011 - In Majda Trobok, Nenad Miščević & Berislav Žarnić (eds.), Between Logic and Reality: Modeling Inference, Action and Understanding. Dordrecht and New York: Springer. pp. 227--242.

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References found in this work

What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs.Georg Kreisel - 1967 - In Imre Lakatos (ed.), Problems in the philosophy of mathematics. Amsterdam,: North-Holland Pub. Co.. pp. 138--157.
Theory of science.Bernard Bolzano - 1972 - Boston,: D. Reidel Pub. Co.. Edited by Jan Berg.
Reals by Abstraction.Bob Hale - 2000 - Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2):100--123.

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