On the truth-convergence of open-minded bayesianism

Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):64-100 (2022)
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Abstract

Wenmackers and Romeijn (2016) formalize ideas going back to Shimony (1970) and Putnam (1963) into an open-minded Bayesian inductive logic, that can dynamically incorporate statistical hypotheses proposed in the course of the learning process. In this paper, we show that Wenmackers and Romeijn’s proposal does not preserve the classical Bayesian consistency guarantee of merger with the true hypothesis. We diagnose the problem, and offer a forward-looking open-minded Bayesians that does preserve a version of this guarantee.

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Tom F. Sterkenburg
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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References found in this work

Theory of Probability.Harold Jeffreys - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (2):263-264.
Probabilities over rich languages, testing and randomness.Haim Gaifman & Marc Snir - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (3):495-548.
Bayesian Orgulity.Gordon Belot - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (4):483-503.
Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.

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