Toward a theory of event identity

Philosophy of Science 41 (1):65-83 (1974)
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Abstract

This paper takes the first steps in the construction of a theory of event identity as that theory applies to historical sentences. The theory is extensional throughout. Following statements of criteria of adequacy for the construction, Davidson's method of regimenting sentences is adopted in order to allow for variables ranging over events. Events in this theory are only partially construed, that is, to the extent of treating them as concrete individuals rather than as classes or repeatable universals. The paper concludes with a statement of several theorems and definitions and an example of how the theory works

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Citations of this work

Non-events.John M. Morris - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (3):321 - 324.
Adequacy conditions and event identity.Michael Bradie - 1981 - Synthese 49 (3):337 - 374.

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References found in this work

The logical form of action sentences.Donald Davidson - 1966 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 81--95.
Action, Emotion and Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Philosophy 39 (149):277-278.
The calculus of individuals and its uses.Henry S. Leonard & Nelson Goodman - 1940 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (2):45-55.
Philosophy of Logic.Michael Jubien & W. V. Quine - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):303.
Individuals.David Pears & P. F. Strawson - 1961 - Philosophical Quarterly 11 (44):262.

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