Hale's ‘Weak Sense’ is Just too Weak

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):209-213 (2000)
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10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00011.x

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Citations of this work

Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo‐Logicism.Fraser MacBride - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):103-163.

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Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects. [REVIEW]John P. Burgess - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (4):638-640.

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