Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief

In From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press (1983)
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Stephen Stich
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.
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Behavior, ISO functionalism, and psychology.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (2):191-209.

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