Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure

Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261 (1976)
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10.1007/bf00411885

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reprint Stine, Gail (1999) "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure". In DeRose, Keith, Warfield, Ted A., Skepticism: a contemporary reader, pp. : Oxford University Press (1999)

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