Abstract

In this paper, I offer a third way in debates over the scope of phenomenal consciousness, in the form of a novel synthesis of liberal and conservative introspective observations. My primary claim is that at least some liberal observations arise due to the existence of a heretofore unrecognized type of phenomenal concepts, liberal phenomenal concepts, while conservative observations arise by virtue of the nonexistence of at least some types of liberal phenomenal contents. Liberal phenomenal concepts, when deployed in direct introspection on phenomenal consciousness, misrepresent consciousness as including high-level, liberal contents. The misattribution of these contents to consciousness is partly defeasible, however: by using a more methodical, stringent heuristic for cataloging the introspected contents of consciousness, it is possible to note the nonexistence of liberal phenomenal contents. Thus, at least in some cases, conservatives are right and liberals are wrong about the scope of phenomenal consciousness. However, liberals have picked up on something conservatives have missed: an inaccurate introspective appearance caused by liberal phenomenal concepts. The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin by defending the faithfulness to introspection of liberal and conservative observations in the context of the debate over the existence of cognitive phenomenology. I then show how liberal phenomenal concepts can explain these observations, and discuss three jointly sufficient conditions whose collective truth serves to establish that a type of liberal content is misattributed to phenomenal consciousness by such concepts. Before concluding, I briefly consider an explanation for why liberal phenomenal concepts might exist.