Presentism and Physicalism

Abstract

Presentism is the view that only the present exists, which mates with the A-theory’s temporal motion and non-relational tense. After examining the compatibility of a presentist world with both special relativity and wavefunction collapse, I invoke physicalism to argue against presentism. I will show why anyone who accepts even a modest physicalism about the mind should have high credence that ours is a block, rather than a presentist universe.

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