Judgment Internalism: An Argument from Self-Knowledge

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):489-503 (2018)
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Abstract

Judgment internalism about evaluative judgments is the view that there is a necessary internal connection between evaluative judgments and motivation understood as desires. The debate about judgment internalism has reached a standoff some time ago. In this paper, I outline a new argument for judgment internalism. This argument does not rely on intuitions about cases, but rather it has the form of an inference to the best explanation. I argue that the best philosophical explanations of how we know what we desire require that judgment internalism is true, which gives us a good reason to believe that judgment internalism is true.

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Jussi Suikkanen
University of Birmingham

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Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..

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