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Unlike Diamonds, Defibrillators Aren’t Forever: Why It Is Sometimes Ethical to Deactivate Cardiac Implantable Electrical Devices
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 28 (2):338-346 (2019)
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Citations of this work
Heartbeats, Burdens, and Biofixtures.Kelsey Gipe - 2021 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30 (2):285-296.
References found in this work
Killing and Allowing to Die: Another Look.Daniel P. Sulmasy - 1998 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 26 (1):55-64.
A Moral Argument against Turning Off an Implantable Cardiac Device: Why Deactivation Is a Form of Killing, Not Simply Allowing a Patient to Die.Thomas S. Huddle - 2019 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 28 (2):329-337.
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