Never Just Save the Few

Utilitas 34 (3):275-288 (2022)
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Abstract

Most people have the intuition that, when we can save the lives of either a few people in one group or many people in another group, and all other things are equal, we ought to save the group with the most people. However, several philosophers have argued against this intuition, most famously John Taurek, in his article ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ They argue that there is no moral obligation to save the greater number, and that we are permitted to save either the many or the few. I argue in this article that, even if we are almost completely persuaded by these ‘numbers sceptics’, we ought not to just save the few. If the choice is simply between saving the many or the few, we ought to save the many.

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Leora Urim Sung
University College London

Citations of this work

Each counts for one.Daniel Muñoz - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (10):2737-2754.
Moral Uncertainty, Proportionality and Bargaining.Patrick Kaczmarek, Harry R. Lloyd & Michael Plant - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Save the Five: Meeting Taurek's Challenge.Zach Barnett - 2025 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (2):576–585.

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References found in this work

Should the numbers count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.
What to do when you don’t know what to do.Andrew Sepielli - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:5-28.
Love and the Value of a Life.Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (3):251-280.
Abortion and Moral Risk.D. Moller - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (3):425-443.

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