The Completeness Theorem? So What!

In Antonio Piccolomini D'Aragona, Perspectives on Deduction: Contemporary Studies in the Philosophy, History and Formal Theories of Deduction. Springer Verlag. pp. 39-50 (2024)
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Abstract

Bolzano reduced inferential validity of the inference (from premise judgements to conclusion judgment) to the holding of logical consequence between the propositions (in themselves) that serve as contents of the respective judgements. This explicit reduction of inferential validity among judgements to logical consequence among propositions (or, alternatively, to logical truth of certain implicational propositions) has been largely taken over by current logical theory, say, by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, by Hilbert and Ackermann, by Quine, and by Tarski also. Frege, though, stands out among those who did not adopt such an account. Under the Bolzano reduction also some blind inferences, with no epistemic support, are deemed valid, which is unacceptable. The Completeness Theorem reduces inferential validity to the logical truth of a certain well-formed formula, whence the unacceptable blindness phenomena are retained. Accordingly, the interest of the Completeness Theorem for logic, construed as the theory of inference, is nugatory.

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Göran Sundholm
Leiden University

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