Pragmatism and purism in artificial intelligence and legal reasoning

AI and Society 3 (1):28-38 (1989)
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Abstract

The paper identifies and assesses the implications of two approaches to the field of artificial intelligence and legal reasoning. The first — pragmatism — concentrates on the development of working systems to the exclusion of theoretical problems. The second — purism — focuses on the nature of the law and of intelligence with no regard for the delivery of commercially viable systems. Past work in AI and law is classified in terms of this division. By reference to The Latent Damage System, an operational system, the paper articulates and responds to conceivable purist (jurisprudential and AI) objections to such a program. The methods of the pragmatist are also called into question and refined. The author concludes that pragmatism within a purist framework is the only sound approach to developing reliable AI systems in law

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