Objectivism, Hybridism, and Subjectivism about Meaning in life
Abstract
This chapter is an opinionated survey of three main views about meaning in life: objectivism, on which a component of a person’s life can contribute meaning to it even if she in no way cares about the component; pure subjectivism, on which the person’s caring about the component in some suitable way is all it takes for the component to contribute meaning to her life; and hybridism, on which whether a component of someone’s life contributes meaning to it depends both on her caring about the component in some suitable way and the objective value of the component. The authors discuss various central challenges that these three views respectively face. Among other things, they provide reasons to think that the challenges for pure subjectivism are less serious than they are ordinarily taken to be, and less serious than those that confront objectivism and hybridism.