Godel's interpretation of intuitionism

Philosophia Mathematica 14 (2):208-228 (2006)
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Abstract

Gödel regarded the Dialectica interpretation as giving constructive content to intuitionism, which otherwise failed to meet reasonable conditions of constructivity. He founded his theory of primitive recursive functions, in which the interpretation is given, on the concept of computable function of finite type. I will (1) criticize this foundation, (2) propose a quite different one, and (3) note that essentially the latter foundation also underlies the Curry-Howard type theory, and hence Heyting's intuitionistic conception of logic. Thus the Dialectica interpretation (in so far as its aim was to give constructive content to intuitionism) is superfluous.

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William W. Tait
University of Chicago

Citations of this work

Gödel on intuition and on Hilbert's finitism.W. W. Tait - 2010 - In Kurt Gödel, Solomon Feferman, Charles Parsons & Stephen G. Simpson (eds.), Kurt Gödel: essays for his centennial. Ithaca, NY: Association for Symbolic Logic.
Montague’s Paradox, Informal Provability, and Explicit Modal Logic.Walter Dean - 2014 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (2):157-196.
On the Concept of Finitism.Luca Incurvati - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2413-2436.

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References found in this work

Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 12 (1):109-110.
The Calculi of Lambda-conversion.Alonzo Church - 1985 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

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