The proof paradigm and the moral discovery paradigm

In Which rights should be universal? New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this chapter, Talbott explains how the Proof paradigm, a model of top-down reasoning, has led to a serious misunderstanding of how moral judgments are epistemically justified. Talbott develops an alternative equilibrium model of moral reasoning based on the work of Mill, Rawls, and Habermas and uses it to show how bottom-up reasoning could have led to the discovery of human rights. Talbott uses the U.S. Constitution to illustrate the idea that guarantees of basic human rights are components of a self-improving self-regulating system for promoting justice. The system does not have to begin with self-evident or even true principles of justice. Bottom-up reasoning can lead to changes that make it more just over time.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,518

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
9 (#1,534,659)

6 months
9 (#519,282)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

William J. Talbott
University of Washington

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references