Abstract

According to a well-known principle in democratic theory, all those whose interests are affected by a decision should have a say in it. ‘How much of a say?’ is the next question. One answer is the Proportionality Principle, according to which ‘people should have a say in a decision proportionally to the extent that their interests are affected by it’. It is often suggested that this principle should be implemented through weighted voting. This article considers an alternative: weighting as part of internal deliberation before the casting of votes. Instead of weighting votes as we count them, we could apply the Principle to the more fundamental process by which citizens form their judgements about how to vote. This alternative approach conceives of citizens as fulfilling dual roles: first, as _claim-makers_ advancing claims about what the collective decision should be, based _inter alia_ on how it impacts their own interests, and, second, as _adjudicators_ taking into account everyone’s claim by weighing it proportionally to the degree each claimant is affected by the collective decision. I examine the democratic and epistemic strengths of this alternative as well as its weaknesses, compared to the more standard way of implementing the Proportionality Principle via weighted voting.