Abstract

Recent work in different fields of cognitive sciences seems to support the idea that in order to explain awareness of visually presented objects some kind of binding mechanism is needed for the correct conjunction of different sensory features into a whole percept. Selective attention is commonly invoked as the key for solving this conjunction problem. Accordingly, the cognitive neurosciences have begun to investigate what kind of neural processing could underlie such a process. I analyse the evidence provided for justifying the existence of a binding problem and I argue against the claim that there is a feature binding problem to be solved in order to explain unity of object awareness. In particular, I question the definition of 'feature' and suggest some possible sources of misunderstanding related to this definition. Finally, I suggest an alternative approach in which perceived object unity does not rely exclusively on attentional conjunction of sensory features: instead of a general and unique mechanism mediating object awareness, I examine evidence that there are at least as many binding mechanisms as potential ways of interacting with visually presented objects.