Abstract

Various disastrous consequences have been attributed to ethical relativism, ranging from increased crime rates to the decline of Western cultural values. While sceptical about such empirical claims, this article contends that relativism has subv ersive interpretative consequences, i.e. those pertaining to the viability of our ethical self‐understanding. The main such consequence is its subversion of the idea of ethical critique, which in turn undermines (i) the distinction between reason and power and (ii) the idea of ethical progress. In defending consequence (i), a critique is offered by Ronald Dworkin's arguments to the effect that no meta‐ethical view can have subversive practical implications. In defending consequence (ii), anti‐relativism is distinguished from historicism, chauvinism and ethical monism. Doubts are then raised about various strategies for re‐investing relativism with critical power. The article concludes with the suggestion that relativism's consequences warrant a presumption against its acceptance.