Discordant knowing: A puzzle about insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder

Mind and Language 37 (1):73-93 (2020)
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Abstract

This article discusses a puzzle arising from the phenomenon of insight in obsessive–compulsive disorder. “Insight” refers to an awareness or understanding of obsessive thoughts as false or irrational. I argue that a natural and plausible way of characterizing insight in OCD conflicts with several different possible explanations of the epistemic attitude underlying insight‐directed obsessive thought. After laying out the puzzle for five proposed explanations of obsessive thought and then discussing several possible ways that the puzzle might be avoided, I close the article by arguing that we can avoid the puzzle by adopting a new positive view of insight‐directed obsessive thought.

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Evan Taylor
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.

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