Abstract

A Theory of Justice by John Rawls is unquestionably one of the most important contributions to moral theory in this century. In this book John Rawls develops the familiar theory of the social contract found in Locke, Rousseau and Kant, augmented by modern decision theory, to provide a theoretical framework to justify fundamental moral principles. While there is an extensive body of literature in the philosophical journals on Rawls' book, no one has attempted a comprehensive assessment of the contractarian theory of justification that has been proposed. Instead, most articles have focused on the narrower question of whether the choices of rational individuals in the contractual situation can settle the question of justification for fundamental moral principles. We attempt to respond to these criticisms by placing the contractarian theory of justification within a broader analytic framework, by analyzing the relationship between the meaning of "justice" and the contractarian theory of justification and demonstrating that formal decision theory can be applied to the contractual situation. ;The second chapter summarizes the contribution of recent analytic philosophers to normative theory and suggests where further contributions are needed. ;The third chapter is devoted to an explanation of Rawls' overall methodology and in specific the logical status of "justice as fairness." Following the philosophical tradition of W. V. Quine, John Rawls attempts to develop an explication of our ordinary concept of "justice" which will provide the theoretical framework for sound moral argumentation. Our examination of both concepts leads us to conclude that he succeeds in this endeavor. ;The structure of the formal argument to justify Rawls' principles of justice is fully developed in the fourth chapter. Some deficiencies are identified which prove fatal to Rawls' argument and some remedies are offered. Specifically, we argue that it would be difficult for rational agents to choose among the alternatives due to the broad scope of the veil of ignorance. In addition, the validity of the maximin principle is questioned because of some implausible conclusions that follow from its use. To overcome these difficulties we propose some refinements to Rawls' treatment of probability and suggest that Bayesian model is the appropriate decision procedure. With these modifications we are able to construct a valid argument demonstrating that Rawls' two principles of justice are preferable to utilitarianism.