The paradox of epistemic ability profiling

Journal of Philosophy of Education 57 (4-5):880-900 (2024)
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Abstract

Intellectually disabled students face particular barriers to epistemic participation within schooling contexts. While negative forms of bias against intellectually disabled people play an important role in creating these barriers, this paper suggests that it is often because of the best intentions of educators and peers that intellectually disabled students are vulnerable to forms of epistemic injustice. The author outlines a form of epistemic injustice that operates through an educational practice widely regarded as serving the interests of intellectually disabled students. ‘Epistemic ability profiling’ involves the identification of the epistemic consequences of disability in the service of promoting students’ best interests, or to create opportunities for their participation in epistemic communities. Epistemic ability profiling is a double-edged sword: it is important that educators understand and attend to the ways in which differences in ability shape students’ epistemic agency, and yet epistemic ability profiling operates against the background of a conceptually ableist conceptual terrain. As a result, epistemic ability profiling runs the risk of legitimating structural forms of injustice against intellectually disabled people.

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Ashley Taylor
Seattle Pacific University

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