Abstract

The focus of this project is to show that Dewey's moral method is a consistent development out of this more general philosophical world view, and cannot be appreciated or defended apart from this position. The work begins with a general discussion of Dewey's philosophical mission, as he saw it, and the introduction of naturalism. Chapters two through four apply this naturalism to metaphysics, epistemology and social philosophy. The major notion to come out of these chapters is that of 'transactionalism'; this claims, in particular, that the concepts 'individual' and 'social' are abstractions--useful for some projects, but not ultimate distinctions. This Deweyan notion did not receive full treatment until late in his life, and yet it is claimed in this work that this is the central notion supporting Dewey's philosophy. In the opinion of the author this notion has been relatively neglected in the literature; this work will attempt to develop this notion and place it as a necessary component of Dewey's constructive moral method. ;In chapter five the moral method of Dewey is laid out and explained in detail. As developed by Dewey this method seems to have a major flaw in that it looks to be incapable of placing any constraints on moral choice, and is open to being used to justify any evil action as long as it meets the requirements of intelligent reflection. At this point the notion of transaction is used to provide such a constraint on moral choice. Even though Dewey did not make use of the concept in this way it is the opinion of the author that the broader philosophical approach taken in this work warrants such usage. This addition completes the method and makes it a non-foundational alternative to the extreme positions of moral foundationalism and moral anarchy