Understanding the Revisability Thesis

Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):180-195 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

W. V. Quine famously claimed that no statement is immune to revision. This thesis has had a profound impact on twentieth century philosophy, and it still occupies centre stage in many contemporary debates. However, despite its importance it is not clear how it should be interpreted. I show that the thesis is in fact ambiguous between three substantially different theses. I illustrate the importance of clarifying it by assessing its use in the debate against the existence of a priori knowledge. I show how the three different readings of the thesis can be used to generate three substantially different and philosophically significant arguments against the a priori. I further challenge each one of these arguments against the a priori.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,401

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How contingent and how a priori are contingent a priori truths?Jacek Wawer - 2016 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 28:25-56.
Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification.Albert Casullo - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):41-58.
On the Relationship between A Priori and Necessary Statements.Albert Casullo - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):283-287.
A Priori Justification and Experience.Jamie Carlin Watson - 2009 - Dissertation, Florida State University
Indeterminate Analyticity.Martin Montminy - 2023 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 11 (5).
Three theses on acts.David Botting - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):65 – 79.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-03-10

Downloads
94 (#230,870)

6 months
12 (#218,371)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Célia Teixeira
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

Citations of this work

What Logical Evidence Could not be.Matteo Baggio - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2559–2587.
How not to reject the a priori.Célia Teixeira - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):365-384.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel, Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.

View all 34 references / Add more references