Abstract

Brian Skyrms has studied the evolutionary dynamics of a simple bargaining game. Fair-dealing is the strategy 'demand 1/2', competing with the more modest strategy 'demand 1/3' and the greedier strategy 'demand 2/3'. Individuals leave offspring in proportion to their accumulated payoffs. The rules for payoffs from encounters penalize low- and high-demanders. The result is a significant basin of attraction for fair-dealing as an evolutionarily stable strategy. From these considerations Skyrms concludes that a disposition to fair-dealing could have evolved. A very different picture emerges, however, when one considers genetic bases for the dispositions involved. A simple two-allele sexual model produces very different stable equilibria in the distribution of behavioral phenotypes. The equilibria for Skyrms's purely phenotypic selection process will not in general be attainable once one enters some simple genetic considerations