Abstract
In this paper I focus on the work of Sayyid Qutb and in particular his book Milestones, which is
often regarded as the Communist Manifesto of Islamic fundamentalism.
This paper has four main sections. First I outline Qutb’s political position and in particular
examine his advocacy of offensive jihad. In section two I argue that there are a number of tendencies
that make his position potentially more liberal that it is often taken to be. I here argue
that there are at least six reasons why Qutb’s position is not intrinsically as anti-liberal as it
might at first appear. First, many western liberals, influenced by the social contract tradition,
regard the legitimacy of their societies as based on popular sovereignty. Qutb, however, regards a society based on popular sovereignty, where law emerges from the will of man rather than the
will of God, as a form of tyranny, so it would seem that he is in principle opposed to Western
liberal societies. It is not clear, however, that we, or Islamic fundamentalist, need to regard
Western liberal societies as based on popular sovereignty, for it is always possible to interpret
Western political institutions through the lens of natural law theory, which was one of the main
sources of the liberal tradition. In this section I will compare Qutb’s political philosophy with
that of Aquinas to illustrate this point and suggest the possibility of secularists and puritan
Islamists being able to form an overlapping consensus on the legitimacy of liberal Western societies.
Secondly, there is an analogue to the social contract in Qutb’s own position as he believes
that legitimate authority requires the free submission of the governed. Thirdly, Qutb is in principle
a fallibilist about human reason; this fallibilism extends even to our capacity to interpret
divine revelation. Fourthly, Islamic universalism requires that Muslims regard enemies they
might be fighting as potential converts. Fifthly, Qutb, like most Sunni fundamentalists, is an
implacable enemy of theocracy. And finally, Qutb is a gradualist. In the third section I argue
that the real danger for liberal societies from believers in a position like Qutb’s is sociological
rather than intrinsic to the ideology – specifically, that there is a danger that such groups may
develop in a ‘Leninist’ direction. In the final section I argue that one of the main reasons for this
danger is the lack of a consensus in the Islamic world about what it is to be a good, or even a
true, Muslim, and that the slow emergence of some sort of consensus will require a vigorous
public debate amongst Muslims. Western liberals should welcome such debate rather than fearing
such, and should do all they can to ensure that civil society, both in Western societies and in
predominantly Islamic societies, is open to such debate.