Abstract

Risk assessment should not be interpreted as a primary guide to decision unless the specific values incorporated into its concept of risk are stated explicitly and justified philosophically. Such a statement would allow value questions which have been sublimated by the factual tone of the analytic techniques to be debated on clear, social and ethical grounds. ;The philosophical critique is mounted on two levels. First, an epistemological critique surveys distinctions between the technical concept of risk and more familiar senses of risk. The critique shows that utilization of risk assessment re-structures the concept of risk. The technical concept is contrasted to the function of risk within a decision maker's conceptual agenda and hierarchy of values. Second, an ethical critique exposes the value commitments of risk assessment recommendations. Although some of these values might be defended for policy decisions, the technical character of risk assessment obfuscates normative issues. Risk assessment is shown to be a form of factual enquiry which, nonetheless, represents a commitment to a specific selection of ethical and social values. ;The dissertation is a critical examination of risk assessment and its role in public policy. Nuclear power safety issues are selected as the primary source of illustrations and examples. The dissertation examines how risk assessment studies develop a concept of risk which becomes decisive for policy choices. Risk assessment techniques are interpreted as instruments which secure an evaluation of risk which, in turn, figures prominently in technical reports on nuclear power